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Governmental Regulation of Cybersecurity 
in the EU and Hungary after 20001
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The term information security evolved to cybersecurity nowadays, which 
emphasises the interdependence of information assets and the importance of cyber-
physical systems. Parallel to this, the need for appropriate management of the EU 
and government strategies and new public administration tasks also appeared.
In the European Union, the first measure concerning this issue was the 
establishment of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA) in 2004, mostly with consultative tasks. The first official cybersecurity 
strategy in the EU, called the Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, was accepted 
in 2013. Afterwards, ENISA’s role has been strengthened as well as its range of 
tasks were broadened. Beside the critical infrastructure protection efforts, the 
Network Information Security (NIS) directive and related legislation were a giant 
leap towards a common level of cybersecurity in the community. The formation 
of an EU Cybersecurity Act and filling NIS with more practical guidance is an 
ongoing process nowadays.
Despite being a post-socialist country, Hungary is in the first line of legislation 
on cybersecurity in the community. Since 2005 there were several government 
decrees, from 2009 the first act-level rules on the information security of some 
governmental services. Based on the National Security Strategy, the National 
Cybersecurity Strategy was formed in 2013. The same year the first information 
security act applicable to all government, local government, governmental data 
processing and critical infrastructure service providers has come into force. The 
alignment of the National Cybersecurity Strategy to NIS directive happens these 
days.
Thus, the regulation of cybersecurity in the EU and in Hungary are heading in 
the right direction, but the practical implementation today is far away from the 
strategic objectives. The community is lagging far behind the United States of 
America and China, just to mention the most important players in the field.
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Introduction
The word cybersecurity seems to be a bit overused nowadays, but as other researchers have 
already demonstrated, it is different from the “classical” term information security. In both 
terms, information-based assets stored or transmitted using information and communication 
technologies (ICT) are included. But information security also includes paper-based 
information. According to the definition of the International Telecommunication Union’s 
(ITU) definition in 2008, cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, 
security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best 
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment, 
the organisation and user’s assets. Organisation and user’s assets include connected 
computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications 
systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. 
Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the security properties of 
the organisation and user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment. 
The general security objectives comprise the following: availability, integrity—which 
may include authenticity and nonrepudiation—and confidentiality. This is pretty much 
similar to the term information security. However, the term cybersecurity includes non-
information-based assets (e.g., a high-voltage substation) that are vulnerable to threats 
via ICT. This is similar to the interdependency between critical infrastructure elements. 
Thus, “in cyber security the assets that need to be protected can range from the person 
him/herself to common household appliances, to the interests of society at large, including 
critical national infrastructure”. [1: 100] The new model of cybersecurity needs a different 
approach to security organisation: the classical security models have to be revised. [2]
The importance of cybersecurity is well-known and often communicated by decision 
makers. However, the implementation and preparedness have deficiencies. This might 
happen because of lack of knowledge, resources or experience.
Table 1. Legal regulations about cybersecurity in the EU and Hungary.  
[Edited by the author.]
Year The European Union Hungary
2004 Regulation on establishing ENISA
2012 National Security Strategy







2020 The new National Security Strategy
Technological development, as I have already pointed out, made local system security 
improvements indispensable. [3] In case of e-government systems, a higher level of the 
problem also exists: attack against multiple systems or against a full infrastructure. This 
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can be part of a conventional war, as cyberwar, or may be an unconventional event, called 
cyberterrorist attack; they all concern cybersecurity. Thus, a major part of cybersecurity 
can be only managed on governmental or supranational level, with cybersecurity strategies, 
legal regulation, and dedicated authorities. [4] Table 1 shows parallelly the changes in the 
EU and Hungary, which will be detailed in this article.
Cybersecurity Strategy in the EU
Before forming any exact strategy, Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 10th March 2004 establishing the European Network and Information 
Security Agency [5] came into force. The regulation established ENISA, with the following 
objectives (Article 2):
• “the Agency shall enhance the capability of the Community, the member states and, 
as a consequence, the business community to prevent, address and respond to network 
and information security problems;
• the Agency shall provide assistance and deliver advice to the Commission and the 
member states on issues related to network and information security falling within its 
competencies as set out in this Regulation;
• building on national and Community efforts, the Agency shall develop a high level of 
expertise. The Agency shall use this expertise to stimulate broad cooperation between 
actors from the public and private sectors;
• the Agency shall assist the Commission, where called upon, in the technical preparatory 
work for updating and developing Community legislation in the field of network and 
information security.”
It is important to remark the verbs used: enhance, provide, develop, and update. They show 
us an intention to form a soft agency without policy-making power. The exact plans with 
ENISA were also unclear. [6]
The tasks aligned with the objectives above were the followings:
• collect appropriate information to analyse current and emerging risks;
• provide advice to stakeholders;
• enhance cooperation between different actors;
• facilitate cooperation between the Commission and the member states;
• contribute to raise awareness;
• assist the Commission and the member states in their dialogue with industry;
• track the development of standards;
• advise the Commission on research;
• promote risk assessment activities;
• contribute to Community efforts to cooperate with third countries;
• express its own conclusions independently.
As we see from the list above, the tasks are supportive functions. There are no regulatory, 
standardisation or audit functions dedicated to ENISA. In contrast, in the field of data 
protection, the European Data Protection Supervisor has authority to audit EU organisations.
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The bodies of ENISA are the Management Board, the Executive Director, and the 
Permanent Stakeholders’ Group.
The first official cybersecurity strategy in the European Union was formed with 
the JOIN (2013) 1 final, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Cybersecurity 
Strategy of the European Union. It’s the Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace formed on 7th 
February 2013. It states that “the borderless and multi-layered Internet has become one 
of the most powerful instruments for global progress without governmental oversight or 
regulation. While the private sector should continue to play a leading role in the construction 
and day-to-day management of the Internet, the need for requirements for transparency, 
accountability and security is becoming more and more prominent.” [7] The first statement 
is: “The EU’s core values apply as much in the digital as in the physical world, the same 
laws and norms that apply in other areas of our day-to-day lives apply also in the cyber 
domain.” [8] According to Tallinn Manual 2.0, most of the physical world international law 
rules can be applied on the cyberspace conflicts, but there are some unregulated issues. For 
those new points, additional rules are required. But cybercrimes are typically a field where 
all real-life legislation can be used, only the context, the device and the methodology 
changed.
The strategy defined five strategic priorities, which address the challenges:
• “achieving cyber resilience;
• drastically reducing cybercrime;
• developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP);
• develop the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity;
• establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and 
promote core EU values.” [7]
In the first strategic priority—achieving cyber resilience—the need to modernise and 
strengthen ENISA was articulated. [9]
After nine years of ENISA’s operation and providing nearly 300 publications—with 
focus topics incident and risk management, critical infrastructure protection, trust services 
and computing cloud—a new regulation came into force. Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21st May 2013 concerning the European 
Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 460/2004 has changed the objectives: [Section I. Article 2. para 1–5]
• “the Agency shall develop and maintain a high level of expertise;
• the Agency shall assist the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in 
developing policies in network and information security;
• the Agency shall assist the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the 
Member States in implementing the policies necessary to meet the legal and regulatory 
requirements of network and information security under existing and future legal acts 
of the Union, thus contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market;
• the Agency shall assist the Union and the Member States in enhancing and 
strengthening their capability and preparedness to prevent, detect and respond to 
network and information security problems and incidents;
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• the Agency shall use its expertise to stimulate broad cooperation between actors 
from the public and private sectors.” [10]
The tasks were also changed according to the objectives (Article 3):
• “support the development of Union policy and law, by advising, providing preparatory 
work, and analysing;
• support capability building by supporting the member states, promoting voluntary 
cooperation, assisting by the operation of a Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT);
• support the raising of the level of capabilities of national/governmental and Union 
CERTs promoting dialogue and exchange of information, with a view to ensure that, 
with regard to the state of the art, each CERT meets a common set of minimum 
capabilities and operates according to best practices;
• support voluntary cooperation;
• cooperate with Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies;
• contribute to the Union’s efforts to cooperate with third countries and international 
organisations.” [10]
The most important change in the tasks was the establishment of CERT–EU, as a new 
service, and also a part of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT) network 
according to Network Information Security (NIS) directive (Directive [EU] 2016/1148) 
Article 12. Para. 2. Incident management became more important in the operation of 
ENISA with these changes than in 2004. The incident management theory and practice are 
very wide; they range from operational procedures to governmental response. Illustrative 
key topics are ISO/IEC 27035, ITIL-based incident response, forensics, and operation of 
CSIRTs. [11]
The only change in the organisation was the staff’s addition under the Executive 
Director, and the Management Board shall establish an Executive Board.
In 2016, the European Commission adopted the Commission Communication on 
Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and 
Innovative Cybersecurity Industry, COM/2016/0410 final. The document dealt with the 
making of most of NIS cooperation mechanisms and enhancing the capabilities and 
responsibilities of ENISA. The section also mentions European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) 
at Europol as a possible cooperation partner. The Commission is required to evaluate 
ENISA by 20 June 2018, but plans to do it earlier.
So a future change was foreseeable with the 2017/0225 (COD) Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the “EU Cybersecurity Agency”, 
and the repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication 
Technology cybersecurity certification (“Cybersecurity Act”). The voting was forecasted 
to June 2018. Furthermore, on 13th September 2017, the President of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker announced an implementation toolkit for the Network 
and Information Security Directive; and a report to ensure an effective response in case 
of cyber-attacks in the member states.
As the topic is in the focus of general interest and even had many political debates, the 
acceptance lasted for a while. The new act is Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European 
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Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency 
for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity 
certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act). [12]
The objectives of ENISA changed slightly:
• the Agency shall be a centre of expertise on cybersecurity by virtue of its 
independence, the scientific and technical quality of the advice and assistance it 
delivers and the information it provides, the transparency of its operating procedures 
and methods of operation, and its diligence in carrying out its tasks;
• the Agency shall assist the Union institutions, agencies, and bodies, as well as the 
member states, in developing and implementing policies related to cybersecurity;
• the Agency shall support capacity building and preparedness across the Union, by 
assisting the Union, member states and public and private stakeholders in order to 
increase the protection of their network and information systems, develop skills and 
competencies in the field of cybersecurity, and achieve cyber resilience;
• the Agency shall promote cooperation and coordination at Union level among the 
member states, Union institutions, agencies and bodies, and relevant stakeholders, 
including the private sector, on matters related to cybersecurity;
• the Agency shall increase cybersecurity capabilities at Union level in order to 
complement the action of member states in preventing and responding to cyber 
threats, notably in the event of cross-border incidents;
• the Agency shall promote the use of certification, including contribution to the 
establishment and maintenance of a cybersecurity certification framework at Union 
level in accordance with Title III of this Regulation, with a view to increasing 
transparency of cybersecurity assurance of ICT products and services and thus 
strengthen trust in the digital internal market;
• the Agency shall promote a high level of awareness of citizens and businesses on 
issues related to the cybersecurity.
The tasks improved heavily: the task list consists of 60 elements, grouped into the 
following seven articles:
• Tasks relating to the development and implementation of Union policy and law;
• Tasks relating to capacity building;
• Tasks relating to operational cooperation at Union level;
• Tasks relating to the market, cybersecurity certification, and standardisation;
• Tasks relating to knowledge, information and awareness raising;
• Tasks relating to research and innovation;
• Tasks relating to international cooperation.
Another focus is the forming of new European cybersecurity certification schemes (see 
Article 46): “The European cybersecurity certification framework shall be established in 
order to improve the conditions for the functioning of the internal market by increasing 
the level of cybersecurity within the Union and enabling a harmonised approach at Union 
level to European cybersecurity certification schemes, with a view to creating a digital 
single market for ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes.” [12] Those schemes, 
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with the additional national schemes defined in Article 57, may provide a higher level of 
IT security interchangeability within the EU.
Cybersecurity Organisation in Hungary
The first comprehensive security and defence policy system of Hungary after the political 
change in 1989 did not recognise cyber threats. Neither the National Assembly resolution 
no. 94/1998 (XII. 29.) on the security- and defence policy principles of the Republic of 
Hungary, nor the Government Decision 2073/2004. (IV. 15.) on the National Security 
Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, nor the Government Decision 1009/2009. (I. 30.) on 
the National Military Strategy of the Republic of Hungary included cyber defence as an 
objective. According to these policies and strategies, the defence against cyber-attacks 
was treated individually, even in the legal regulation.
The first regulations in Hungary dealing with information security of governmental 
organisations were the following:
• Government Decree 195/2005 (IX. 22) on security, interoperability and uniform use 
of electronic administration systems;
• Government Decree 84/2007 (IV. 25) on security requirements of the Central 
Electronic Service System and related systems;
• Government Decree 193/2005 (IX. 22) on detailed rules for the electronic filing;
• Government Decree 194/2005 (IX. 22) on requirements for electronic signatures 
and the associated certificates used in the administrative proceedings, as well as 
requirements for certification service providers issuing the certificates;
• Government Decree 182/2007 (VII. 10) on the regulation of the central electronic 
service provider system.
The Act on Electronic Public Service (accepted in 2009) was the first act-level regulation 
dealing with information security in governmental organizations. [13]
In sum, we may say that a relatively low awareness of the legislator and the business 
was observable in the usage of international IT security standards, despite its significance 
and the high risk in some areas. [14] No obligations were found in acts of the Hungarian 
Parliament for enforcement of standards in IT security. There have been built-in self-
control procedures in some acts, but in practice, those procedures actually did not work 
efficiently. [15]
In 2009 a small change was commenced with the adoption of Act LX of 2009 on 
electronic public services. It has highlighted the requirement of security as a basic 
principle.
According to Act LX of 2009 on electronic public services, organisations providing 
ICT based public services ensure the publicity of data of public interest (according to the 
Act on data protection and freedom of information) and protection of personal and any 
other data during the provision of services. [16]
IT security-related requirements were detailed in the following regulations:
• Government Decree 223/2009 (X. 14) on the security of electronic public services;
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• Government Decree 224/2009 (X. 14) on the central electronic system service’s 
recipient identification and authentication services;
• Government Decree 225/2009 (X. 14) on electronic public services and their use;
• Government Decree 78/2010 (III. 25) on requirements of electronic signatures in 
administration and certain rules for electronic communication.
A major change in the regulation started with the Government Decision 1035/2012 (II.21.) 
on Hungary’s National Security Strategy, which stated that the information security of 
electronic public services, critical infrastructure and cyber defence capabilities have to 
be improved. The next step in this way was the Government Decision 1139/2013 (III. 21.) 
on Hungary’s National Cybersecurity Strategy, which is still in force. The main objectives 
of it are to stablish incident reporting and response capability, develop international 
cooperation, and develop trainings, exercises, baseline security and cooperation. These 
are actually very similar to the aims of the NIS, but articulated somewhat earlier.
The recent cyber operations increased the global political awareness in this area, thus 
on 25th April 2013 the Hungarian Parliament accepted Act L of 2013 on the electronic 
security of state and local government organisations. It’s scope is slightly broader than just 
state and local government organisations, but also includes national data processors and 
critical infrastructure, therefore even private companies might be included (e.g. public 
utilities). [17] The act is based on international best practices and standards (e.g. ISO/IEC 
27001:2013), although does not reference them directly. The law operates with the essential 
items known in the information security field as the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability). The act requires the integrity and the availability of information systems 
in a closed, complete, consistent way, proportionate to the risks for the electronic system 
and components. It is important to explicitly include the proportionality of the security 
control implementation to risks. This enforces the conduction of a risk assessment and 
decisions based on that. This changes the malpractice of implementing security measures 
in an ad hoc manner, and is to minimise security budgets. [18]
The act established the National Electronic Information Security Authority under the 
control of the Ministry of National Development. The new task of vulnerability testing 
and log analysis was dedicated to the National Security Authority and the long before 
established Government Computer Emergency Response Team (GovCERT) was moved 
to the Special Service for National Security, which is a secret service in Hungary.
Afterwards the field of cybersecurity, including the organisations above, was handed 
over to the Ministry of Interior with Government Decree 187/2015. (VII. 13.). Thus, the 
National Cyber Defence Institute was formed in the Special Service for National Security 
with the following features:
• administration by National Electronic Information Security Authority;
• incident management and response by GovCERT-Hungary;
• forensic log analysis and vulnerability testing by National Security Authority.
Another change coming into force in the meanwhile was the NIS directive. The National 
Cybersecurity Strategy has to be aligned with the requirements of NIS, Chapter II (National 
frameworks on the security of network and information systems) Article 7 (National strategy 
on the security of network and information systems). This is an ongoing process right 
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now. Also, the Information Security Act is affected by NIS, Article 8 (National competent 
authorities and single point of contact) and Article 9 (Computer security incident response 
teams [CSIRTs]). The National Cyber Defence Institute is planned to be a competent 
national authority according to Article 8 of NIS Directive (EU) 2016/1148. There are four 
designated CSIRTs according to Article 8 of this directive:
• LRLIBEK for critical infrastructures, operated by the National Directorate General 
for Disaster Management, Ministry of the Interior;
• MILCERT, operated by the Military National Security Service;
• Hun-CERT, the Hungarian Computer Emergency Response Team for Council 
of Internet Service Providers, operated by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Institute for Computer Science and Control;
• and NIIF-CSIRT, which is the Computer Security Incidents Response Team of NIIF/
HUNGARNET, the Internet provider of universities, higher education institutes, some 
secondary schools, academical research organisations and non-profit institutions in 
Hungary, operated by the National Information Infrastructure Development Institute.
Conclusion
ENISA was established in 2004 as a consultative body. Both the EU and the Hungarian 
Cybersecurity Strategy was accepted in 2013. The strategies implied changes in the 
treatment of the field of cybersecurity at the higher level. The objectives and tasks of 
ENISA have been changed, and the Hungarian authority was formed that year. The next 
step was the NIS directive and its implementation in the member states’ law, which also 
provides reinforcement to EU legislation to improve ENISA.
One of the main objectives and tasks both for ENISA and in the Hungarian regulation is 
the training. Even in the private sector, there is a huge need for well-trained IT personnel. 
The required level of training is much higher in the cybersecurity than in classical back-
office processes. In order to provide hands on knowledge, also real-life laboratories shall 
be used for such training. [19]
Another field of cybersecurity is that of military or cyber warfare. Many EU members, 
including Hungary, is a NATO member, which shapes our defence politics to a greater 
extent than the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. NATO recognised cyberspace 
as a “Domain of Operations” at the Warsaw Summit in 8–9 July 2016. In fact, there are 
no elements which are directly applicable at the member state level. There are many 
potential threats, like PSYOPS in the social media. [20: 117] Also, Internet of Things 
(IoT) as a civilian technology may pose risks to the defence sector. [21] But the fact that 
cyberspace became the fifth domain of operation, and the requirement that all military 
operations shall include such operations, will have a positive effect on defence.
Several changes happened in the previous years in the European legislation, and 
therefore preparedness to cybersecurity risk is much better nowadays, but we lag behind 
the United States of America and behind China. [22] Thus there is a long way to go.
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